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CRITIQUE OF THE ANTITRUST GUIDE:
A REJOINDER

DonaldZ Bakert

I am perplexed by Mr. Griffin's review of the Antitrust Guide to International Operations' (the Guide) because it seems so completely devoid of
philosophical focus. Is his thesis simply that the international antitrust area
is complex? Is he saying merely that the Guide discusses many issues on
which reasonable men may differ? Is he saying that businesses should be
wary of using the Guide as a substitute for experienced antitrust counsel,
such as himself? The answer to each of these questions is of course "yes." If
Mr. Griffin has a general message beyond these points, I am not quite sure
what it is.
The Guide does not purport to solve every single international antitrust
problem. What it does attempt to do, however, is to examine in a coherent
philosophical way an area of the law that has been characterized by much
mechanistic lawyering and academic quibbling. The Guide is intended to
give the business community, the bar, and the Antitrust Division's own staff
some sense of the Division's priorities and concerns-to paint a more comprehensive picture than is possible from the somewhat random process of
prosecuting violations that happen to be discovered and that are documented by enough evidence to proceed. It is a very deliberate attempt to
make the subject less arcane, less technical, and less mysterious, and to inject a broader view into the field. In this sense, the Guide is similar to the
t Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. A.B. 1957, Princeton University; B.A. in Law
1959, Cambridge University; LL.B. 1961, Harvard Law School. From August 1976 to May_
1977 the author served as Assistant Attorney General in Charge of the Antitrust Division, U.S.
Department of Justice.

1. ANTITRUST DIVISION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL
OPERATIONS (1977) [hereinafter cited as ANTITRUST GUIDE], reprinted in ANTITRUST &
TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 799, at E-l (1977), and TRADE REG. REPORTS (CCH) No. 266,
pt. 11 (1977).
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US. Department of JusticeMerger Guidelines2 (the Merger Guidelines), issued just ten years ago. The Merger Guidelines were issued to meet a situation of confusion, criticism, and unpredictability-a situation that led Mr.
Justice Stewart to comment: "The sole consistency ... is that in litigation
under § 7, the Government always wins."'3 The Merger Guidelines, which
were not binding on the courts or, for that matter, on the Department, have
in fact been used by the Department during the past decade as a basic
guide-but not as a slavish rule-in bringing cases. As a result, the Merger
Guidelines have contributed considerably to bringing a sense of order to
the merger field. They have also enjoyed wide use in the counseling of clients on mergers.
The Merger Guidelines consisted largely of a set of formulas that were
used to identify those mergers the Government would "ordinarily challenge" under the antitrust laws. The Guide goes a step further since it exposes the thought process employed by the Antitrust Division in making
prosecutorial decisions. That process is very fact-oriented, as the Guide periodically reemphasizes by suggesting that slightly different facts might produce a different result. The Antitrust Division's internal deliberations focus
much more acutely upon the facts of particular investigations than upon a
mechanical parsing of old cases. In sum, the Antitrust Division does not
view itself as a policeman on the beat enforcing "the law" in a mechanical
way. Rather, it likes to regard itself as a thoughtful champion of competitive policy. In some instances, for example, the Division will decline to en4
force sweeping Supreme Court doctrines that make little economic sense.
At other times it will seek to extend the law beyond its present boundaries-as a result of old, ambiguous, or simply wrongly decided cases. Especially in the latter instance, the Division should maintain a policy of
openness-and the Guide reflects this in several key areas 5 -rather than
allowing the business community to be lulled into a sense of comfort by
relying on old precedents that the Division no longer considers valid.
Mr. Griffin criticizes the Guide as not being a precise statement of the
2. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE MERGER GUIDELINES (1968), reprinted in [1977] 1 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 4510.
3. United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 301 (1966) (dissenting opinion).
4. For example, the Division generally did not enforce the decisions in United States v.
Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967), or Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel
Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969), during the period of 1967-77. Such exercises of prosecutorial discretion are generally justified-quite properly-on the ground that limited staff resources
should be used in more productive areas.
5. See, for example, Interamerican Ref. Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp.
1291 (D. Del. 1970), which the Department roundly criticizes in the Guide as having been
"wrongly decided" and states that it will not follow. See ANTITRUST GUIDE, supra note 1, at
50 (Case K).
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law in a number of respects.6 Of course he is right. The Guide does not
purport to state the law exactly and completely. Rather, it elucidates an
intelligent enforcement program which is intended to be consistent with the
law generally but not necessarily in every respect. Reading the Guide is not
a substitute for reading old precedents; but lawyers who read only the old
precedents may find that some of their clients are in court litigating with the
Government over an old precedent thought by the Government to be outdated, inapplicable, or wrong. To the lawyer or client who wishes to avoid
this risk, the Guide should prove helpful.
Mr. Griffin makes a great deal out of those who are not bound by the
Guide.7 Of course, in a legal sense the Guide does not bind the courts, or
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), or even a future Assistant Attorney
General. The attitude of the FTC in completely disassociating itself from
the Guide demonstrates a certain lack of concern about the problems of
business planning. Further, this attitude highlights the fact that the FTC,
although it has played a relatively minor role in international antitrust enforcement, is definitely a "wild card," probably contributing more confusion to this specialized area than its performance justifies. Partly for this
reason, I would favor eliminating FTC jurisdiction over international antitrust violations.8 In addition to the FTC, the International Trade Commission continues to add a factor of uncertainty to the international antitrust
field. Only experience will show whether serious conflicts on antitrust enforcement questions develop between it and the Antitrust Division.
Private plaintiffs--those much exalted "private attorneys general"-are
a third "wild card" in the international antitrust field because they bring
cases, some sound and some irrational, based purely on their own private
interests. An important test of the Guide will be the extent to which it influences judicial decisionmaking in these "wild card" private cases; to the extent that it does so, it may contribute to a greater sense of order than exists
now in the field. I would hope that the Department of Justice, armed with
the Guide, would play a more active role as amicus in private litigation
than it has in the past. There are still few enough cases in the international
field so that an individual case can have an influence disproportionate to its
initial facts. Only time will tell whether the Guide in fact has a significant
influence in the necessarily unpredictable world of private antitrust litigation.
One point is worth stressing: the Department of Justice has a monopoly
over criminal law enforcement under the antitrust laws. The Guide in6. See, e.g., Griffin, 4 Critiqueof the Justice Department'sAntitrustGuideforInternational

Operations, 11 CORNELL IN'L L. 215, 254 (1978).
7. Id at 217-22.
8. SeeBaker, Antitrust Conflicts Between Friends:Canadaand the UnitedStates in the Mid1970s, 11 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 165, 192 (1978).
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evitably will influence to some degree the Government's criminal enforcement program, and hence will also influence businessmen's sometimes
erratic fears of being subjected to criminal prosecution under what is now a
felony statute. It would be difficult indeed for the Antitrust Division to
bring a criminal prosecution against conduct that it had suggested in the
Guide was permissible, or even against conduct that the Guide suggests
should be subject to a rule of reason analysis. 9 Mr. Griffin's review would
have been a little more balanced had he made this point.
Mr. Griffin has obviously read the Guide carefully, and has produced
pages and pages of detailed criticism on particular issues. Many of the
points he makes were considered and rejected in drafting the Guide because we could come up with no more constructive-let alone coherent-alternative to what we already had. In still other cases, we simply
never resolved the issues that Mr. Griffin brings up. Yet I get very little
overall message from Mr. Griffin, other than that he would have come out
somewhat differently on some issues and would have included a great deal
more exposition of hypothetical alternatives in a broader range of circumstances. This course of action, however, would necessarily have compromised the brevity of the Guide and hence would have made it less useful to
the ordinary person involved in an ordinary case (if such a thing really

exists).
For example, in discussing the interesting question of intraenterprise conspiracy in Case A, the Department makes a serious effort to bring some
order to the Timken doctrine, using the test of "effective working control"
as a basis for drawing the line between (1) arrangements among subsidiaries for which the parent enterprise can allocate markets, and (2) agreements among competitors for which such allocations are per se illegal. 10
Mr. Griffin finds that this approach is in some cases "too narrow and inflex-

ible," especially in cases involving minority positions compelled by foreign
state action." Meanwhile, in dealing with the difficult question of the
length of time a know-how license can be used to justify a territorial restraint, the Guide develops a concept of "reverse engineering," which is
defined as the time period that a qualified competitor would need to develop a product independently. Mr. Griffin finds reverse engineering to be a

"helpful concept" but "imprecise."' 12 Of course, neither of these concepts--effective working control or reverse engineering-provides an automatic test for resolving tough cases. But they do represent a significant step
forward in the analysis, even if they may prove too "inflexible" or too "im9. See Baker, To Indict or Not to Indict: Prosecutorial Discretion in Sherman Act
Enforcement, 63 CORNELL L. Rlv. 405, 416-17 (1978).
10. ANTIRUST GUm, supra note 1, at 10 (Case A).

11. Griffin, supra note 6, at 229.
12. Id at 236.
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precise" in the context of a particular case. Fortunately, the Guide is not a
statute. Such shortcomings can be overcome with experience.
In places, Mr. Griffin criticizes the Guide for not putting particular situations into neat pigeonholes which he believes the courts have created. For
example, he finds that the Guide's treatment of a hypothetical foreign acquisition "oversimplifies the potential competition doctrine by failing to explain its two different branches." 1 3 One of these branches involves a
"perceived potential entrant" (who in fact may not be likely to enter the
market); the other involves a "probable potential entrant" (who may not be
perceived by those in the market as such). My own view is that this courtcreated dichotomy is in fact somewhat artificial. Although it has used the
doctrine from time to time in litigating cases, 14 the Department generally
tends not to divide the potential competition doctrine into these two precise
categories in conducting investigations. Rather, the normal question is: "Is
this firm likely to enter the market?" This is measured by evidence of both
(1) the firm's own incentives, opportunities, and internal documents, and (2)
the perceptions of the people in the market. For the Department to stress
this dichotomy when it in fact does not use it regularly in analyzing cases
would be disingenuous.
I could give other illustrations of what I regard as "pigeonholing" errors
in Mr. Griffin's analysis. For example, he seems to assume that section 1 of
the Sherman Act 15 is in reality divided into a strict binary choice between
full per se on the one hand and full rule of reason on the other. As a result,
when he finds that the Guide treats patent licenses under the rule of reason
for many purposes and that it subjects know-how licenses to "antitrust
standards which, if anything, are stricter than those applied to patent
licenses," 16 he jumps to the rhetorical conclusion that the Department is
likely to apply a per se rule. He returns to the same theme in discussing
Case G, involving mandatory package licensing, which the Guide suggests
will be subject to "something less than a per se prohibition." 17 This he concludes is unnecessarily confusing.' 8 Quite the contrary; the Guide is not at
all confusing. In the real world, there is indeed a never-never land between
strict per se and full rule of reason, which is well recognized by experienced
antitrust counsel. For lack of a better term, I have labelled this as "soft
core" per se--to distinguish it from "hard core" per se rules, which apply in
13. Id at 232.
14. E.g, United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526 (1973).

15. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
16. ANTITRUST GumE, supranote 1, at 34.
17. Id at 38 (footnote omitted).
18. Mr. Griffin concludes: "As in the discussion of the know-how licensing case, the Guide
is unnecessarily confusing, since this statement could easily be read to indicate that there is
some unstated test of legality, stricter than the rule of reason, yet less strict than a per se
prohibition." Griffin, supranote 6, at 239 (footnote omitted).
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such areas as price fixing. 19 In a strict "hard core" situation, no consideration is given to motives, surrounding circumstances, or potential competitive benefits. Where a "soft core" per se rule applies-as, for example, with
a tie-in or a noncoercive boycott-a court takes a general look at the conduct nominally subject to the per se prohibition and its surrounding circumstances. If the circumstances suggest that the scheme is anticompetitive, the
court pronounces the conduct illegal per se and solemnly announces that no
inquiry is warranted. But if the court finds the conduct in question innocent
or potentially procompetitive, it pronounces the conduct as being outside
the per se category and as a matter of definition subjects it to a full rule of
reason inquiry.
What emerged as the most controversial issue in the Guide, at least in the
discussion in the public press, was the Department's position that the
Noerr-Penningtondoctrine 20 applied to petitions to foreign governments. 2 1
The original Noerr opinion rested in part on first amendment grounds and
in part on the idea that the Sherman Act was not intended to apply to governmental restraints. Thus there has been considerable uncertainty in this
area. The Guide has the virtue of taking a firm position on this point. Because of the importance of the issue and its controversial nature, Mr. Griffin
might have devoted more attention to the question of governmental restraints. Instead, he rehashes the debate very briefly and then criticizes the
Guide for being unclear as to whether the Noerr doctrine would protect a
petition to a government "commercial enterprise." The answer to this query
seems clear: the Guide takes the view that the antitrust laws do apply to
"commercial" actions of foreign governments or instrumentalities, a view
subsequently sustained by the Supreme Court in City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co.22 If government "commercial" activities are not exempt, petitioning a government "commercial" enterprise for
anticompetitive action would clearly not be protected from antitrust prosecution by the enterprise's "governmental" ownership. 23
Like Mr. Griffin, I can regret that the Guide in Case J does not reflect the
teaching of the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Continental T V,
Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.24 If the drafters of the Guide were omniscient,
they could have anticipated precisely what the Supreme Court would say in
an opinion issued five months after the Guide was issued! Of course, Case J
19. See Baker, supra note 9, at 407-08 n.20.
20. See Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127
(1961); United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
21. See ANTITRUST GunaE, supra note 1, at 62 (Case N). This discussion relies on dicta in
Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 707-08 (1962).

22. 98 S. Ct. 1123 (1978).
23. Mr. Griffin also criticizes the Guide for its application of antitrust laws to foreign "commercial" entities. Griffin, supranote 6, at 247.
24. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
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must be used with caution in view of this important subsequent development.
Mr. Griffin concludes with the cheering thought that the Guide represents a "laudable intent to give guidance in a complex area" and that it
embodies "[m]uch careful thought and analysis."' 25 One can readily agree
with him that "the Guide does not resolve all confusion and fears concerning the application of American antitrust laws to international business operations." '26 But if it simply reduces some substantial part of the confusions
and fears in this area, it will have succeeded in all that its creators could
have hoped for.
25. Griffin, supranote 6, at 254.
26. Id (footnote omitted).

